David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
David Hume is widely recognized as providing the most influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate — the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism. The arguments that Hume advances on this subject are found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human Nature (2.3.1-2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although there is considerable overlap in content between these two statements of Hume's position, there are also some significant differences. This includes, for example, some substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine foreknowledge. While these differences are certainly significant they should not be exaggerated. Hume's basic strategy and compatibilist commitments in both works remain the same in their essentials..
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Similar books and articles
James A. Harris (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Peter Millican (ed.) (2002). Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. Oxford University Press.
Kate Abramson (2001). Sympathy and the Project of Hume's Second Enquiry. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):45-80.
P. J. R. Millican (ed.) (2002). Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings. Cambridge University Press.
Paul Russell (1995). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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