Merleau-ponty and the myth of bodily intentionality
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 22:35-47 (1988)
I argue that, while merleau-ponty succeeds in justifying the claim that certain human intentional states essentially involve an embodied subject, one cannot justifiably assert the further claim that this sort of bodily intentionality involves a radically different account of what makes the state intentional. contrary to some currently popular interpretations, i argue that merleau-ponty's account of bodily intentionality requires the use of concepts and representations.
|Keywords||Metaphysics intention body representation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Charles R. Varela (1994). Harré and Merleau-Ponty: Beyond the Absent Moving Body in Embodied Social Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (2):167–185.
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