The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

Open Court (1985)
Abstract
THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore I prefer to describe my philosophy as "logical atomism," rather than as "realism," whether with or without some prefixed adjective.
Keywords Bertrand Russell  Logical atomism
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Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Thomas Mormann (2012). A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (1): 27 - 37.
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.

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