David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 73 (1):3-9 (2013)
Are the moral intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? According to what has become known as ‘the expertise defence’, the answer is in the affirmative. This answer has been sustained by drawing on analogies to expertise in other fields. However, in this article it is argued that the analogies presuppose two assumptions – the causal assumption and the quality assumption – which are not satisfied in relation to philosophical expertise. Thus, it is suggested that there are reasons to be sceptical with regard to the expertise defence
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Regina A. Rini (2014). Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
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