David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 39 (4):759-770 (2011)
The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore ( 2007 ) and McGrath ( 2007 ) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected. As we will see, there are different ways in which coincidence scenarios may be thought to support perdurantism, some of which have not yet been sufficiently explored. Thus, my immediate goal is to explore one of those directions, bringing into focus a new argument from coincidence to perdurantism. And although I motivate my discussion by examining the arguments in the work of Gilmore and McGrath, the merits of this argument can be independently assessed. More generally, my overall purpose is to contribute to our general understanding of how the topics of coincidence and persistence bear on each other
|Keywords||Persistence Coincidence Endurantism Perdurantism Four-dimensionalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Josh Parsons (2007). 7. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.
Cody Gilmore (2006). Where in the Relativistic World Are We? Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. Eddon (2010). Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):721-728.
Mark Moyer (2009). Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?∗. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.
Mark Moyer (2006). Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence? Synthese 148 (2):401 - 423.
Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.
M. Lange (2010). What Are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter)? Mind 119 (474):307-340.
David Owens (1992). Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge University Press.
Yuri Balashov (2000). Persistence and Space-Time. The Monist 83 (3):321-340.
Thomas Sattig (2010). Compatibilism About Coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3):273-313.
Yuri Balashov (2000). Relativity and Persistence. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):562.
Cody Gilmore (2007). Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3. Clarendon Press 177-198.
Giovanelli Marco, Erich Kretschmann as a Proto-Logical-Empiricist: Adventures and Misadventures of the Point-Coincidence Argument.
Added to index2011-03-27
Total downloads75 ( #44,879 of 1,725,935 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #268,758 of 1,725,935 )
How can I increase my downloads?