Revised Factualism

The Monist 77 (2):207-216 (1994)
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Abstract

I shall argue that those who hold that there are factual complexes, or facts, and who subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth, according to which truth is analyzed in terms of correspondence to facts, need not hold that, in addition to facts, there are propositions.

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Thomas Ryckman
Stanford University

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