Stage theory and proper names

Philosophical Studies 161 (3):367-379 (2012)
Abstract
In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and persist by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best alternative available for them.
Keywords Stage theory  Persistence  Perdurantism  Counterpart theory  Proper names
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References found in this work BETA
Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.
Charles Parsons (2004). Structuralism and Metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):56--77.
Theodore Sider (1996). All the World's a Stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.

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