Models in the Brain

Abstract
The mind-body problem is typically divided into three parts: how is it that a physical thing can be conscious? How is it that a physical thing can display intentionality? And how is it that a physical thing can be rational? These three problems correspond to three leading features of the mind, each of which at one time or another has been called a “mark” of the mental (by, inter alia, Descartes, Brentano, and Sellars respectively).
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