Who's afraid of the big, bad wolf? Naturalizing empty concepts

Externalist theories of representation (including most naturalistic psychosemantic theories) typically require some relation to obtain between a representation and what it represents. As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals. On this account, the brain is a general-purpose model-building machine, where items in the world serve as templates for model construction. Shareable empty concepts arise when there is a common template for different individuals' concepts, but where this template is not what the concept denotes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Tom Stoneham (1999). Boghossian on Empty Natural Kind Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Barbara Abbott (2011). Support for Individual Concepts. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:23-44.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

41 ( #80,924 of 1,725,873 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #166,949 of 1,725,873 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.