Online research in philosophy

Rethinking R.G. Collingwood reviews Collingwood's thought via his own rethinking of Hegel. It establishes the revisionary character of Collingwood's defence of liberal civilization in theory and practice. Collingwood is seen as avoiding the pitfalls of Hegel's teleological historicism by developing an open and contestable reading of the rationality of liberal civilization, which neither reduces practice to theory nor philosophy to history. The contemporary relevance of Collingwood's standpoint is demonstrated by comparing it with those of recent defenders and critics of liberalism Rawls, Lyotard and MacIntyre.

The author states that, taking into account Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts, there is an important relation between Collingwood's doctrine of absolute presuppositions and his theory of historical understanding.

R.G. Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics is a full-fledged response toA.J.Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer's book forced Collingwood to revisit his critique of realism, to respond to the 'scientific dogmatism' of logical positivism, and to modify his own idealist metaphysical views in new and unprecedented ways. This article argues that Collingwood's critique of Ayer provides the impetus for the later metaphysical theory of An Essay on Metaphysics. Part I delineates Collingwood's critique of realism as a 'sea anemone view of knowledge.' Part II argues that Ayer's logical positivism is a form of realism. Part III contends that Collingwood's response to Ayer -- a historical metaphysics based on absolute presuppositions and the logic of question and answer -- presupposes a novel, modified coherence theory of truth. Collingwood's later metaphysics signify merely a shift in how he responds to different forms of realism, however, rather than a significant turn in his thought.

Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience re-visits Collingwood's body of work and locates it in the context of the fundamental problems of philosophy and shows that Collingwood is both an influential and key philosophical figure of the twentieth century.

In this paper, I discuss the role of Anselm’s ontological argument in the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Anselm’s argument appears prominently in Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) and Essay on Metaphysics (1940), as well as in his early work Speculum Mentis (1924). In the proof, Collingwood finds the central expression of the priority of “faith” in the first principles of thought to reason’s activities. For Collingwood, it is Anselm’s proof that clearly expresses this relationship between faith and reason. The two elements of this analysis that must be understood if one is to understand Collingwood’s use of the proof are what he means by “the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason” and the “special case of metaphysical thinking.” I analyze both of these elements and conclude by showing how Anselm’s proof is essential to Collingwood’s historical science of mind.