The Concept of Mind

Hutchinson and Co (1949)
This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
Keywords Concept  Linguistic Analysis  Mental Process  Metaphysics  Mind  Psychology
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Call number BF161.R9 2002
ISBN(s) 0090238923   1432588257   1163186953   0389002321   1164504002   0140124829   0226732967   9780415485470   1436716233   0140600329  
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Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.

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