Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||In this paper, we introduce a suppositional view of linguistic practice that ranges over fiction, science, and mathematics. While having similar con- sequences to some other views, in particular Linsky and Zalta’s plenitudinous platonism, the view advocated here both differs fundamentally in approach and accounts for a wider range of phenomena and scientific discourse.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Mary Leng (2010). Mathematics and Reality. OUP Oxford.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta (1995). Naturalized Platonism Versus Platonized Naturalism. Journal of Philosophy 92 (10):525-555.
Øystein Linnebo (2009). Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mary Leng (2005). Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
Charles Parsons (2008). Mathematical Thought and its Objects. Cambridge University Press.
David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
Bernard Linsky (2005). Remarks on Platonized Naturalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-15.
Added to index2010-05-14
Total downloads36 ( #38,268 of 753,454 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,000 of 753,454 )
How can I increase my downloads?