David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 4 (3):285-304 (2007)
Testimony is an indispensable source of information. Yet, contrary to ‘literalism’, speakers rarely mean just what they say; and even when they do, that itself is something the hearer needs to realize. So, understanding instances of testimony requires more than merely reading others' messages off of the words they utter. Further, a very familiar and theoretically well-entrenched approach to how we arrive at such understanding serves to emphasize, not merely how deeply committed we are to testimony as a reliable source of information, but that epistemological questions about testimonial belief are – perhaps even must be – posterior to such a commitment. This result does not itself dictate any particular views on the epistemology of testimony. However, not only does the failure of literalism not support the view that the justificatory basis of testimony-based beliefs is importantly inferential; it in fact undermines a key premise in one important argument for the view that one needs independent, positive reasons for accepting a given testimonial report. More generally, the present paper illustrates how discussions of the epistemology of testimony might usefully interact with an examination of the epistemology of understanding
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References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press.
H. P. Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Endre Begby (2014). Lexical Norms, Language Comprehension, and the Epistemology of Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):324-342.
Don Fallis (2012). Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality. Dialectica 66 (4):563-581.
Francesca Poggi (2011). Law and Conversational Implicatures. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 24 (1):21-40.
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