On the pessimistic induction and two fallacies

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1088-1098 (2005)
Abstract
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.
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    Paul Dicken (2013). Normativity, the Base-Rate Fallacy, and Some Problems for Retail Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):563-570.
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