The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Science

Abstract
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Alan Baker (2009). Mathematical Explanation in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):611-633.
Citations of this work BETA
Juha Saatsi (2012). Mathematics and Program Explanations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):579-584.
Similar books and articles
Juha Saatsi (2007). Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):19 – 33.
Alan Baker (2009). Mathematical Explanation in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):611-633.
Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):231-250.
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