David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66 (2006)
This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion of the looping effect of the human sciences, can be developed into an argument for the view that there is no theory-independent true nature of intentional action. If the Davidsonian line of thought is correct, the theory of collective intentionality is, in a sense, true if we accept the theory. Key Words: collective intentionality • experimental economics • social identity theory • Donald Davidson • Ian Hacking • constructivism • action • agency • philosophy of the social sciences
|Keywords||Collective Economics Identity Intentionality Science Social Psychology Social Sciences|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John R. Searle (1991). Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344.
Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
Lee McIntyre (2004). Intentionality, Pluralism, and Redescription. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505.
John R. Searle (2009). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford University Press.
J. Krause (2012). Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.
Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.) (2003). Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads72 ( #28,752 of 1,696,540 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #184,517 of 1,696,540 )
How can I increase my downloads?