Cognitive closure and the limits of understanding

Ratio 7 (1):26-42 (1994)
The paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind‐body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non‐naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to dissolve
Keywords Body  Cognitive  Metaphysics  Mind  Mcginn, C
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00151.x
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Lucy F. O'Brien (1996). Solipsism and Self-Reference. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):175-194.

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Colin McGinn (2004). Consciousness and its Objects. Oxford University Press University Press.
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