Kant's first analogy and the refutation of idealism

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):113–130 (2006)
Abstract
In what follows I will address Kant’s concerns in the First Analogy and in the Refutation of Idealism. Because the two discussions have a similar trajectory, it is of interest to identify some of the differences between them. As we will see, the manifest differences are indicative of more significant underlying differences, regarding two ways of construing transcendental proofs.
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