David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):73 - 83 (2008)
In this essay I defend the claim that all reasons can ground final requirements. I begin by establishing a prima facie case for the thesis by noting that on a common-sense understanding of what finality is, it must be the case that all reasons can ground such requirements. I spend the rest of the paper defending the thesis against two recent challenges. The first challenge is found in Joshua Gert’s recent book, Brute Rationality. In it he argues that reasons play two logically distinct roles – requiring action and justifying action. He argues, further, that some reasons – ‘purely justificatory’ reasons – play only the latter role. Jonathan Dancy offers the second challenge in his Ethics Without Principles, where he distinguishes between the ‘favoring’ and ‘ought-making’ roles of reasons. While all reasons play the former role, some do not play the latter, and are therefore irrelevant to what one ought to do. My contention is that both Gert and Dancy are going to have trouble accounting for our intuitions in a number of cases.
|Keywords||Reasons Practical reason|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Paul Hamilton (2004). Might There Be Legal Reasons? Res Publica 10 (4):425-447.
Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Joshua Gert (2005). A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353 - 378.
Patricia Greenspan (2011). Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press 39.
Maria Alvarez (2009). How Many Kinds of Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
Patricia Greenspan (2007). Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'. In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press 172-194.
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Simon Robertson (2008). Not so Enticing Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263 - 277.
Joshua Gert (2004). Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #94,044 of 1,699,425 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #161,079 of 1,699,425 )
How can I increase my downloads?