David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 55 (2):131-147 (2012)
Abstract McDowell's contributions to epistemology and philosophy of mind turn centrally on his defense of the Aristotelian concept of a ?rational animal?. I argue here that a clarification of how McDowell uses this concept can make more explicit his distance from Davidson regarding the nature of the minds of non-rational animals. Close examination of his responses to Davidson and to Dennett shows that McDowell is implicitly committed to avoiding the following ?false trichotomy?: that animals are not bearers of semantic content at all, that they are bearers of content in the same sense we are, and that they are bearer of ?as if? content. Avoiding the false trichotomy requires that we understand non-rational animals as having concepts but not as making judgments. Furthermore, we need to supplement McDowell's distinction between the logical spaces of reasons and of the realm of law with what Finkelstein calls ?the logical space of animate life?. Though McDowell has taken some recent steps to embrace a view like this, I urge a more demanding conception than what McDowell has thus far suggested
|Keywords||McDowell naturalism animal minds Davidson Dennett|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's Transcendental Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.
David H. Finkelstein (2003). Expression and the Inner. Harvard University Press.
David H. Finkelstein (2007). 5 Holism and Animal Minds. In Alice Crary (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond. Mit. 251.
H. J. Glock (2000). Animals, Thoughts and Concepts. Synthese 123 (1):35-104.
Robert Hanna (2009). Embodied Minds in Action. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Carl B. Sachs (2011). The Shape of a Good Question: McDowell, Evolution, and Transcendental Philosophy. Philosophical Forum 42 (1):61-78.
Anil Gomes (2011). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry 54 (3):277-292.
Jesús Coll Mármol (2007). Conceptual Schemes and Empiricism: What Davidson Saw and McDowell Missed. Theoria 22 (2):153-165.
Jan Almäng (2006). McDowell's Naturalism. In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator för en Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his Sixtieth Birthday. Philosophical Communications.
Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
Jesús Coll Mármol (2007). Conceptual Schemes and Empiricism. Theoria 22 (2):153-165.
Cheryl K. Chen (2006). Empirical Content and Rational Constraint. Inquiry 49 (3):242 – 264.
Alan Thomas (1997). Kant, McDowell and the Theory of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):283-305.
Adrian Haddock (2009). McDowell, Transcendental Philosophy, and Naturalism. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):63-75.
Bill Pollard (2005). Naturalizing the Space of Reasons. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):69 – 82.
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
Akeel Bilgrami (1994). On McDowell on the Content of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):206-13.
Joseph T. Rouse (2005). Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language. Inquiry 48 (1):38-61.
Frederick R. Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
Added to index2012-03-02
Total downloads29 ( #63,416 of 1,100,077 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #40,751 of 1,100,077 )
How can I increase my downloads?