The nature of transcendental arguments

The paper aims to cast light on the kind of proof involved in central transcendental arguments. It is suggested that some of the difficulty associated with such arguments may result from the tendency to construe them simply as articulating relations between concepts or propositional contents. A different construal, connected with phenomenological description, is outlined, as a way of bringing out the force of these arguments. It is suggested that it can be fruitful to think in terms of this construal in understanding some of Kant's transcendental proofs. The recommended construal also helps to understand the nature of the link between transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09672550500321502
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Immanuel Kant (2007/1951). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 507-508.
Barry Stroud (1968). Transcendental Arguments. Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):241-256.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

131 ( #18,967 of 1,727,166 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #74,830 of 1,727,166 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.