David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205 (2007)
In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3)
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John W. Bickle (2008). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. A Bradford Book.
Ronald P. Endicott (1998). Collapse of the New Wave. Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):53 - 72.
Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse (2007). Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub-Types. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
Terence E. Horgan (2001). Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.
John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
Frank Hofmann (2007). Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Graham Macdonald (2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #127,180 of 1,707,756 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #104,804 of 1,707,756 )
How can I increase my downloads?