David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press (2005)
It seems that when the term "coreference" is used, whether in linguistics or in philosophy, there is often presumed to be a consensus about what it is, or at least about what it is in the context where the term is introduced. I don't think the term deserves to have much use at all, insofar as it disguises more interesting linguistic and pragmatic relations between nominal forms in natural language. My preoccupation with these relations issues in part from some of the central concerns and distinctions introduced in Evans (1980), an essay that has had wide and, in some cases, a very deep influence on how a variety of reference issues have been addressed in modern linguistics. As a linguist, my interest is in the way in which natural language shapes what we know and from that perspective, I want to understand how natural language sets boundary conditions on how linguistic forms can be used to achieve readings that pick out the same entity more than once.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Hartley Slater, Epsilon Calculi. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.
Barbara Hall Partee (1970). Opacity, Coreference, and Pronouns. Synthese 21 (3-4):359 - 385.
Robert May (2012). What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not. Thought 1 (1):41-48.
George Lakoff (1970). Linguistics and Natural Logic. Synthese 22 (1-2):151 - 271.
Ken Safir (1992). Implied Non-Coreference and the Pattern of Anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1):1 - 52.
Ángel Pinillos (forthcoming). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #126,509 of 1,004,649 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,617 of 1,004,649 )
How can I increase my downloads?