Competing semantics of vagueness: Many values versus super-truth

Synthese 33 (2-4):195--210 (1976)
A semantics of vagueness should reject the principle that every statement has a truth-value yet retain the classical tautologies. A many-value, non-truth-functional semantics and a semantics of super-valuations each have this result. According to the super-valuation approach, 'if a man with n hairs on his head is bald, then a man with n plus one hairs on his head is also bald' is false because it comes out false no matter how the vague predicate 'is bald' is appropriately made precise. But why should a sentence in which components actually remain imprecise be regarded as actually false just because it would be false if its components were precise? On one of the alternative treatments of quantification allowed by the many-value approach, the sentence in question is assigned an intermediate value closer to 'false' than to 'true'. Despite the elegance of the super-valuation approach, there are reasons to prefer the many-value approach.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00484714
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Dummett (1975). Wang's Paradox. Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
Richmond Campbell (1974). The Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):175 - 191.
David H. Sanford (1975). Borderline Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mark Sainsbury (2015). Vagueness and Semantic Methodology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):475-482.
Rosanna Keefe (2008). Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

17 ( #160,237 of 1,726,181 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #118,705 of 1,726,181 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.