Decision science: From Ramsey to dual process theories

Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143 (2010)
Abstract
The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.
Keywords Decision theory  Decision science  Decision-making  Human reasoning  Dual process theory  Rationality  Prospect theory  Expected utility  Normative man  Economic man  Rational angel  Ramsey
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Peter Carruthers (2002). The Cognitive Functions of Language. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 25 (6):657-674.

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