David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143 (2010)
The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.
|Keywords||Decision theory Decision science Decision-making Human reasoning Dual process theory Rationality Prospect theory Expected utility Normative man Economic man Rational angel Ramsey|
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Citations of this work BETA
Conrad Heilmann (2014). Success Conditions for Nudges: A Methodological Critique of Libertarian Paternalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (1):1-20.
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