David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1995)
A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Unlike party puzzles or brain teasers, many paradoxes are serious in that they raise serious philosophical problems, and are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. To grapple with them is not merely to engage in an intellectual game, but to come to grips with issues of real import. The second, revised edition of this intriguing book expands and updates the text to take account of new work on the subject. It provides a valuable and accessible introduction to a range of paradoxes and their possible solutions, with questions designed to engage the reader with the arguments and full bibliographical references to both classic and current literature on the topic.
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|Call number||BC199.P2.S25 1995|
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Citations of this work BETA
Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.
Roger Clarke (2010). “The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer. Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
Wesley Elsberry & Jeffrey Shallit (2011). Information Theory, Evolutionary Computation, and Dembski's "Complex Specified Information". Synthese 178 (2):237 - 270.
Jordi Valor Abad (2008). The Inclosure Scheme and the Solution to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Synthese 160 (2):183 - 202.
Dennis Earl (2010). Vague Analysis. Metaphysica 11 (2):223-233.
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