David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Argument and Computation 3 (1):49 - 82 (2012)
In this article, we first present the platform and the Dislog language, designed for discourse analysis with a logic and linguistic perspective. The platform has now reached a certain level of maturity which allows the recognition of a large diversity of discourse structures including general-purpose rhetorical structures as well as domain-specific discourse structures. The Dislog language is based on linguistic considerations and includes knowledge access and inference capabilities. Functionalities of the language are presented together with a method for writing discourse analysis rules. Efficiency and portability of the system over domains and languages are investigated to conclude this first part. In a second part, we analyse the different types of arguments found in several document genres, most notably: procedures, didactic texts and requirements. Arguments form a large class of discourse relations. A generic and frequently encountered form emerges from our analysis: ?reasons for conclusion? which constitutes a homogeneous family of arguments from a language, functional and conceptual point of view. This family can be viewed as a kind of proto-argument. We then elaborate its linguistic structure and show how it is implemented in . We then investigate the cooperation between explanation and arguments, in particular in didactic texts where they are particularly rich and elaborated. This article ends with a prospective section that develops current and potential uses of this work and how it can be extended to the recognition of other forms of arguments
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Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
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