Explaining the tension between the supreme court's embrace of validity as the Touchstone of admissibility of expert testimony and lower courts' (seeming) rejection of same
Episteme 5 (3):pp. 329-342 (2008)
| Abstract | By lopsided majorities, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of cases, persistently commanded the lower courts to condition the admission of proffered expert testimony on the demonstrated validity of the proponents’ claims of expertise. In at least one broad area – the so-called forensic sciences – the courts below have largely evaded the Supreme Court's holdings. This paper aims to try to explain this massive defiance by the lower courts in terms of social epistemology | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesSusan Haack (2008). What's Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32:20-35.
Tony Ward (2006). English Law's Epistemology of Expert Testimony. Journal of Law and Society 33 (4):572-595.
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