Aristotle's Conception of Universality
| Abstract | Against the standard interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate realist about universals, I argue that he knew of and rejected this position and that he held that universals do not exist independently of the mind, but have a mind-independent basis in relations of commensurability and causality between particulars and their attributes. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Aristotle universals concepts realism | |||||||||
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Mark Gifford (1999). Aristotle on Platonic Recollection and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30. Phronesis 44 (1):1-29.
Mark Gifford (1999). Aristotle on Platonic Recollection and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30. Phronesis 44 (1):1-29.
Phil Corkum (forthcoming). Substance and Independence in Aristotle. In B. Schnieder, A. Steinberg & M. Hoeltje (eds.), Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, Philosophia Verlag.
T. Scaltsas (1994). Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Cornell University Press.
Markus Kohl (2008). Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis 53 (2):152-179.
Larry Lee Blackman (1983). Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
Michael J. Loux (ed.) (1970/1976). Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. University of Notre Dame Press.
Paul Vincent Spade, Boethius Against Universals: The Arguments in the Second Commentary on Porphyry.
Charles Landesman (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York,Basic Books.
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