Fictional Reports

Theoria 25 (2):175-185 (2010)
Abstract
Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another by virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow
Keywords fictional reports  fictional names  sententialism  interpreted logical forms  gappy propositions  name-using practices
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