David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185 (1977)
Carl G. Hempel has often stated that inductive-statistical explanations, as he conceives them, are inductive arguments. This discussion note raises the question of whether such arguments are to be understood as (1) arguments of the traditional sort, containing premises and conclusions, governed by some sort of inductive "acceptance rules," or (2) something more closely akin to Carnap's degree of confirmation statements which occur in an inductive logic which entirely eschews inductive "acceptance rules." Hempel's writings do not seem unequivocal on this issue. It is suggested that adoption of construal (2) would remove the need for Hempel's high probability requirement on I-S explanations
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