Indeterminism and epistemic relativization
Philosophy of Science 44 (2):199-202 (1977)
| Abstract | Carl G. Hempel's doctrine of essential epistemic relativization of inductive-statistical explanation seems to entail the unintelligibility of the notion of objective homogeneity of reference classes. This discussion note explores the question of whether, as a consequence, essential epistemic relativization also entails the unintelligibility of the doctrine of indeterminism | |||||||||
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Wesley C. Salmon (1977). Hempel's Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185.
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