Synthese 97 (2):249 - 267 (1993)
|Abstract||In 1981, A. C. Crombie identified six styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition that constitute our ways of reasoning in the natural sciences. In this paper, I try to show that these styles constitute reasoning in the social sciences as well, and that, as a result, the differences between reasoning about the physical world and about human beings are not so different as some interpretevists have supposed.|
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