Should we attempt to justify induction?

Philosophical Studies 8 (3):33 - 48 (1957)
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References found in this work BETA
Hans Reichenbach (1949). The Theory of Probability. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Max Black (1954/1971). Problems of Analysis. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Max Black (1959). Can Induction Be Vindicated? Philosophical Studies 10 (1):5 - 16.
Michael P. Smith (1987). Virtuous Circles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):207-220.

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Wesley C. Salmon (1963). On Vindicating Induction. Philosophy of Science 30 (3):252-261.
Peter Lipton (2000). Tracking Track Records, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):179–205.
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