Truth-tracking and the problem of reflective knowledge Joseph Salerno saint Louis university
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||In “Reliabilism Leveled” Jonathan Vogel (2000) provides a strong case against epistemic theories that stress the importance of tracking/sensitivity conditions. A tracking/sensitivity condition is to be understood as some version of the following counterfactual.|
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