Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405 (2006)
|Abstract||Philosophers widely agree that emotions may have or lack appropriateness or fittingness, which in the emotional domain is an analogue of truth. I defend de Sousa's account of emotional truth by arguing that emotions have cognitive content as digitalized evaluative perceptions of the particular object of emotion, in terms of the relevant formal property. I argue that an emotion is true if and only if there is an actual fit between the particular and the formal objects of emotion, and the emotion's propositional content is semantically satisfied, or the target of the emotion exists. Emotions meet the syntactic and disciplinary requirements of minimally truth-apt states. Appropriate fit occurs when lower-level properties of particular objects of emotion provide sufficient warrant to make ascription of the relevant formal properties superassertable|
|Keywords||Appropriateness Emotion Epistemology Perception Truth De Sousa, Ronald|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Emotional Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):247-63.
Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
William Fish (2005). Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
Edmund T. Rolls (2007). Emotion Explained. OUP Oxford.
Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247 - 275.
Peter M. S. Hacker (2004). The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of the Emotions. International Review of Psychiatry 16 (3):199-208.
P. M. S. Hacker (2009). The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of Emotions. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.
David Pugmire (2002). Narcissism in Emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):313-326.
Mikko Salmela (2011). Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception? Dialectica 65 (1):1-29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,762 of 739,336 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,937 of 739,336 )
How can I increase my downloads?