True emotions

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405 (2006)
Philosophers widely agree that emotions may have or lack appropriateness or fittingness, which in the emotional domain is an analogue of truth. I defend de Sousa's account of emotional truth by arguing that emotions have cognitive content as digitalized evaluative perceptions of the particular object of emotion, in terms of the relevant formal property. I argue that an emotion is true if and only if there is an actual fit between the particular and the formal objects of emotion, and the emotion's propositional content is semantically satisfied, or the target of the emotion exists. Emotions meet the syntactic and disciplinary requirements of minimally truth-apt states. Appropriate fit occurs when lower-level properties of particular objects of emotion provide sufficient warrant to make ascription of the relevant formal properties superassertable.
Keywords Appropriateness  Emotion  Epistemology  Perception  Truth  De Sousa, Ronald
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00448.x
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References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (2003). Emotion and Moral Judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):104–124.
Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.

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