Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 32 (2):137-146 (1965)
|Abstract||A consideration of some basic problems that arise in the attempt to provide an adequate characterization of statistical explanation is taken to show that an understanding of the nature of scientific explanation requires us to deal with the philosophical problems connected with the nature of prior probabilities|
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