The spirit of logical empiricism: Carl G. Hempel's role in twentieth-century philosophy of science
Philosophy of Science 66 (3):333-350 (1999)
| Abstract | In this paper, I discuss the key role played by Carl G. Hempel's work on theoretical realism and scientific explanation in effecting a crucial philosophical transition between the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, the dominant view was that science is incapable of furnishing explanations of natural phenomena; at the end, explanation is widely viewed as an important, if not the primary, goal of science. In addition to its intellectual benefits, this transition has important practical consequences with respect to dealing with the global problems humans everywhere will face in the twenty-first century | |||||||||
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A. Richardson (2003). The Geometry of Knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the Formalization of Philosophy in the 1920s. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):165-182.
Alan W. Richardson (1998). Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Friedman (2008). Wissenschaftslogik : The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science. Synthese 164 (3):385 - 400.
Thomas E. Uebel & Alan W. Richardson (eds.) (2007). The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
Carl G. Hempel (2000). Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Carl G. Hempel (2001). The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
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