Is the human mind massively modular?

In Rod Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell (2006)
Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com- posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition – the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi- tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology
Keywords Mechanism  Mind  Modularity
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    Sheldon J. Chow (2013). What's the Problem with the Frame Problem? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):309-331.
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