Autonomy, adaptation, and rationality-a critical discussion of Jon Elster's concept of "sour grapes," part II
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (2):173-205 (1999)
This paper argues against Jon Elster's contention that there is a fundamentalincompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on theother hand, adaptation to conditions of one's existence in the sense that one'sdesires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While thefirst part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster's discussion ofthese ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the conceptof rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is claimed that Elster's conclusionsconcerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conceptionof human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that thesedefects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Donald W. Bruckner (2009). In Defense of Adaptive Preferences. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.
Similar books and articles
Jon Elster (2000). Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints. Cambridge University Press.
Jon Elster (1983). Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
Philippe Mongin (1991). Rational Choice Theory Considered as Psychology and Moral Philosophy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):5-37.
Tore Sandven (1995). Intentional Action and Pure Causality: A Critical Discussion of Some Central Conceptual Distinctions in the Work of Jon Elster. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (3):286-317.
Peter Stone (2003). The Impossibility of Rational Politics? Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):239-263.
Robert Sugden (1985). Reviews Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Jon Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 220 Pages. Having Reasons: An Essay on Rationality and Sociality, Frederic Schick, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983, 160 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):337-.
Jon Elster (1996). Rationality and the Emotions. Economic Journal 106:1386-97.
Michael Dummett (1988). Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, Editors. In Series Studies in Rationality and Social Change, Edited by Jon Elster and Gudmund Hernes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 250 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):177.
Allen W. Wood (1986). Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation. Inquiry 29 (1-4):11 – 27.
Tore Sandven (1999). Autonomy, Adaptation, and Rationality a Critical Discussion of Jon Elster's Concept of "Sour Grapes". Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (1):3-31.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #142,253 of 1,100,115 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #304,144 of 1,100,115 )
How can I increase my downloads?