Countering Kauffman with connectionism: Two views of Gene regulation and the fundamental nature of ontogeny

Understanding the operation and evolution of gene regulation networks is critical to understanding ontogeny and evolution. According to Stuart Kauffman's view, (1) each cell type cycles through its own repeated pattern of gene expression, (2) the order of ontogeny is dependent on these cycles being short, and (3) evolution is possible because these cycles mutate gradually. This view of gene regulation reflects Kauffman's view that ontogeny is fundamentally the process of cells repeating cycles of activity. I criticize Kauffman's view of gene regulation networks and offer the connectionist theory of gene regulation as an alternative. On this view, the generic order of gene regulation mechanisms is due to the qualitatively consistent way that one gene product influences the expression of another. This allows networks to be stable and evolve to regulate accurately, allowing cells to react appropriately to their microenvironments, due to design by natural selection. Introduction Kauffman's Model of Gene Regulation Explaining the Order of Kauffman's K = 2 Networks The Importance and Relevance of Kauffman's Explanations of the Order of Gene Regulation Additional Orderly Facts of Transcription The Order of Network Accuracy The Accuracy of Connectionist Networks The Evolvability of Gene Regulation Networks Laws of Structure CiteULike Connotea What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axn005
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