David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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It is widely recognized that Kuhn and Feyerabend did not mean the same thing when they originally spoke of the incommensurability of competing theories. Feyerabend employed the term ‘incommensurability’ to refer to the absence of logical relations between theories due to semantic variance of the terms employed by theories. Kuhn employed the term to describe the obstacles to communication between advocates of rival paradigms which result from perceptual, methodological and semantic differences between paradigms. While Feyerabend’s use of the term remained constant throughout much of his writing on the topic, in his later work Kuhn developed a refined version of the notion of incommensurability which involved the inability to translate between holistically interdefined subsets of terms within the vocabulary of alternative theories.
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