Distinctness and non-identity

Analysis 65 (288):269–274 (2005)
The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Terence Parsons (1987). Entities Without Identity. Philosophical Perspectives 1:1-19.
Peter Unger (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.
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