Deﬂationism and truth
|Abstract||There is a line of argument which aims to show that certain ontological claims are harmless by making use of conservativity results. The argument goes back to Hilbert who set its general frame. Hilbert’s concern was with certain abstract (ideal) entities in mathematics but the argument has been applied without discrimination to avoid ontological commitment to abstract entities in physics (Field) or to avoid ontological commitment to semantical properties like truth (Shapiro).|
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