Acta Analytica 21 (2):30-40 (2006)
|Abstract||This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism—as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., Moral Reasons , 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book Ethics without Principles (2004)—and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), and her later book, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999). I shall argue that Dancy’s particularism is more radical, but also more plausible, than Cartwright’s, concluding that we have good reason to embrace a scientific particularism that is far closer to Dancy’s ethical particularism than any view defended by Nancy Cartwright, or any other philosopher from the ‘Stanford school’ of scientific theory.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Whiting (2007). Defending Semantic Generalism. Analysis 67 (296):303–311.
Mary Tjiattas (2007). Against Moral Particularism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-24.
Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
David Bakhurst (2005). Particularism and Moral Education. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):265 – 279.
Jonathan Dancy (2009). Moral Particularism. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Edmund Wall (2012). The Real Direction of Dancy's Moral Particularism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):587-612.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Philipp Schwind (2006). A Critical Discussion of Jonathan Dancy's Moral Particularism. Dissertation, St. Andrews
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #28,462 of 556,772 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,999 of 556,772 )
How can I increase my downloads?