Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion

Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of epistemic relativism in recent history and philosophy of science (critical rationalism, historical philosophy of science and the strong programme) draw upon the problem of the criterion. It is briefly suggested that a particularist response to the problem of the criterion may be put to good use against epistemic relativism.
Keywords epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism  problem of the criterion  particularism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Larry Laudan (1989). If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):369-375.
    John Worrall (1989). Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):376-388.

    View all 6 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.

    View all 6 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
    Tomoji Shogenji (2000). The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):501-525.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-10-07

    Total downloads

    43 ( #32,956 of 1,089,155 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,953 of 1,089,155 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.