Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion

Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of epistemic relativism in recent history and philosophy of science (critical rationalism, historical philosophy of science and the strong programme) draw upon the problem of the criterion. It is briefly suggested that a particularist response to the problem of the criterion may be put to good use against epistemic relativism.
Keywords epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism  problem of the criterion  particularism
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References found in this work BETA
Larry Laudan (1989). If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):369-375.
John Worrall (1989). Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):376-388.

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Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Steven Bland (2013). Scepticism, Relativism, and the Structure of Epistemic Frameworks. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):539-544.

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Similar books and articles
Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Tomoji Shogenji (2000). The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):501-525.
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