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- Louis N. Sandowsky (2005). From Space and Time to the Spacing of Temporal Articulation: A Phenomenological Re-Run of Achilles and the Tortoise. Existentia (1-2).In view of the primacy assigned to the 'present' in traditional metaphysics, in terms of the ways in which questions about existence are expressed, the following discussion takes the question of the temporalizing of the present as its theme. This involves unravelling the historical traces of the thought of the present as a finite, closed, objective point of a successive continuum of discrete moments (a real oscillation between the now and the not-now) by returning to the phenomenological sense of the present as the stretching out of an opening – the 'living Present' (lebendige Gegenwart) – which bears its continuity of presence and non-presence within itself (without restriction to linearity). The transition itself suggests something like a quantum-leap and, in another sense, it also extends beyond the bounds of this simile (and the discontinuity that is implied) by evoking the image of a 'twist' or a 'turn.’ In order to grasp the significance of this turn we shall first examine – re turn to – its main obstacle: the concept of time as a linear and corpuscular continuum. The traditional model of time as a succession of 'now-points' (a notion that 1 still infects discourse on temporality) has always undermined our understanding of 'presence' as that which maintains itself (abides) through succession. In effect, presence must be 'maintained' [maintenant] within the 'now.' Yet, if the 'now' is constantly shifting into non-being through its replacement by a new 'now' then presence must be infused with its own negation and a certain discontinuity. How is it possible, then, to speak of the 'persistence' of 'identity' as something unitary (simultaneous with itself) existing through plurality and successive fragmentation into non-being? Furthermore, in reference to motion, what is entailed in the possibility of experiencing the transition of a selfsame (particular) object from one spatial location to another: how is it that the object 'endures' through its spatial and temporal transition? Since antiquity the question of simultaneity has been taken for granted – generally being consigned to mere spatial models..Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is wholly present at more than one time. For short, it persists by enduring. Four-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by having a temporal part at that time, and it persists if it has distinct temporal parts at more than one time. For short, it persists by perduring (Jackson 1998, p. 138). In the light of these comments, some readers will perhaps find the question that forms the title of this paper a little puzzling. They may have learned to use the terms ‘fourdimensionalism’ ‘perdurantism’ and ‘belief in temporal parts’ interchangeably; or perhaps even to define one in terms of the other. Such a usage, however, is inapposite. We might imagine a Flatland-like world of two spatial dimensions and one temporal, whose philosophers are divided between a theory of persistence on which they persist by having temporal parts, and a theory on which they persist by being wholly located in each of several times. This is just the same issue we face, but at least the label ‘four-dimensionalism’ seems inapposite: the four-dimensionalist Flatlanders believe in only three dimensions!
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time is discrete, I then turn to some possible empirical evidence, which we do not yet have. This evidence is based on some slight differences between commonly occurring differential equations and their discrete analogs.
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| | Other links: jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The main objective of this paper is to introduce the space-time concept of V. I. Vernadsky and to show the importance of this concept for understanding the biosphere theory of Vernadsky. A central issue is the principle of dissymmetry, which was proposed by Louis Pasteur and further developed by Pierre Curie and Vernadsky. The dissymmetry principle, applied both to the spatial and temporal properties of living matter, makes it possible to demonstrate the unified nature of space and time. At the same time, this principle shows the difference between the spatial-temporal properties of living matter and those of the inert environment. Living matter as opposed to the inert environment is an important part of the Weltanschauung of Vernadsky and is connected with all basic statements of his theoretical system.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Though there are many analogies between time and space, there appear to be three commonplace yet deeply perplexing features of time that reveal it to be quite unlike space. These can be called ‘orientation’, ‘flow’ and ‘presence’. By orientation I mean that there is a direction to time, a temporal order between events which is not merely a reflection of how they are observed (what McTaggart 1908/1968 labelled the B-series time). Assertions that objects stand in spatial relations, such as to the left of, or above, or to the north of explicitly depend upon the position from which they are asserted or upon arbitrary, conventionally established spatial frameworks. There is nothing intrinsic about them; the objects involved are, so to speak, indifferent to them. Temporal relations are not like that – times are not just arranged along, as it were, a line but are successive along that imaginary line. Whether one event is before or after another is not (altogether) dependent upon how, or from where, they are viewed. Nature appears to respect temporal orientation, as enshrined in the laws of thermodynamics, though it remains a deep mystery exactly how the temporally symmetric basic laws of physics ground strongly asymmetric temporal processes (see Sklar 1993).
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| | Scholar | More options ... Metaphysicians of space and time are fond of talking about objects being present at, wholly present at, or existing at certain times, or occupying certain regions of space, or even regions of space-time. Take, for example, this famous set of definitions due to Mark Johnston and David Lewis: Let us say that something persists, iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. (Lewis 1986, p. 202) A great deal of debate has been conducted in this terminology: debates about whether anything does endure or perdure; about the ontology of temporal parts; about whether it makes sense to apply this kind of thinking to space, as well as to time (we can ask, for example, the analogous questions whether things are extended by being entended, or pertended); about whether it can be applied to space-time, and if so, to relativistic space-time. These debates have been fruitful, but cursed with a certain amount of imprecision. People sometimes talk past each..
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| | Other links: otago.ac.nz joshparsons.net | Scholar | More options ... Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological difference involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality Physical theory disregards presence in both the form of mental presence and the form of the temporal present In contrast to mental presence the temporal present is objective in the perspective of the third person. This relative kind of objectivity waits to be utilized for a hypothesis of how the mental and the physical are interrelated In order to do so this paper translates the mind-matter distinction into the distinction between mental and physical time and addresses the problem that panpsychism tries to attack head-on in these temporal terms. There are in particular , two issues thus getting involved: discussions about a time observable and the quantum Zeno effect.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The post-modern, post-enlightenment debate on the nature of being begins with Heidegger’s assertion that the “ancient interpretation of the being of beings” is informed by “the determination of the sense of being as ... ‘presence.’”[i] This understanding, which reduces being to temporal presence, is supposed to have set all subsequent philosophical reflection. At its origin is “Aristotle’s essay on time.” In Heidegger’s reading, Aristotle interprets entities with regard to the present, equating their being with temporal presence. He also takes time itself as a present entity--i.e., “as just one being among others.”[ii] In an interpretation that is essentially “oriented to the world,” Aristotle thus collapses being and temporal presence to the point that the countable nows are, in their presence, taken as entities. Aristotle’s essay, Heidegger claims, “has essentially determined every subsequent account of time--Bergson’s included.” Even “the Kantian interpretation of time” remains under its sway.[iii] Given this, the “destruction” of the tradition that Heidegger proposes[iv] is a destruction of this account.[v] Only through such a destruction can we uncover what the Aristotelian account conceals. In making time objective, it hides Dasein’s (or human being’s) role in temporalization. The project of Being and Time is to uncover this through “the repeated interpretation of the structures of Dasein ... as modes of temporalization.”[vi].
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| | Other links: pdcnet.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... ... there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). ... That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united "forthwith" in a common structure.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... An example of the second situation is the most famous of the paradoxes of Zeno, the Greek philosopher who lived during the Golden Age of Greece on the island of Elea. Zeno proposed the following "thought experiment". Achilles, a young athlete, runs a race with a tortoise. Achilles can run exactly twice as fast as the tortoise, so to make it fair he gives the tortoise a head start of exactly half the distance from the starting line to the finish line. The starting signal is given and the race begins. Achilles runs to the starting position of the tortoise. In the time it takes to do that, the tortoise has advanced half the distance from his starting position and the finish line. Achilles then advances to the new position of the tortoise. During that time the tortoise again advances half the distance to the finish line. And so on ... Every time Achilles moves ahead by a given distance, the tortoise moves ahead by half that distance. Zeno concluded that Achilles can never catch the tortoise, because in every time interval in which Achilles moves to the tortoise's former position, the tortoise always moves ahead by half that distance.
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| | Scholar | More options ... My research in phenomenology and existentialism has always been drawn, through a deconstructive lens-piece, to the significance and key importance of the issue of temporality – that, indeed, consciousness [Bewusstsein], Being-there [Dasein], and Being-for-itself [Être-pour-soi] are other names for the articulation of time. The horizon of Temporality (Temporalität – with its transcendental character) could be said to refer to the absolute horizon of all horizons of Being. In the following essay on the spacing of temporal articulation (based on a research paper of the same title that I wrote in 1989 during the period of my M.A. studies in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University), I examine some of the ways in which phenomenology, existentialism and deconstruction have radicalized the treatment and conceptualization of time in contemporary philosophy. The principal focus is on how they have successfully exposed the kinds of aporia that infect the popular model in which time is expressed as a linear succession of 'discrete' moments. The importance of the analyses undertaken by Husserl and Heidegger, in particular, lies in the way in which their 'horizonal' (horizontal and vertical) approach to time shows how the 'now,' far from being a discrete moment or extensionless point, is intrinsically 'spanned.' This represents much more than a mere reiteration of the..
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| | Other links: cafedifferance.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Louis N. Sandowsky, From space and time to the spacing of temporal articulation: a phenomenological re-run of Achilles and the tortoise
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