Has psychology debunked conceptual analysis?

Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33 (2006)
The philosophical method of conceptual analysis has been criticised on the grounds that empirical psychological research has cast severe doubt on whether concepts exist in the form traditionally assumed, and that conceptual analysis therefore is doomed. This objection may be termed the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I discuss the Charge from Psychology and argue that it is misdirected.
Keywords philosophical method  psychology  conceptual analysis
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00412.x
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