How the epistemic relativist may use the sceptic's strategy: A reply to Markus Seidel

This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for employing the idiom of objectivity rather than that of absolutism which Seidel prefers.
Keywords Epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism
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References found in this work BETA
Larry Laudan (1989). If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):369-375.
Howard Sankey (2011). Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.

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Harold Zellner (1995). “Is Relativism Self-Defeating?”. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:287-295.
Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.

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