Intermediate conclusions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):61 – 64 (1975)
A statement q is a conclusion intermediate between p and h if and only if (1) p justifies h, (2) p justifies q, and (3) (p and not-q) justifies h to a significantly lesser degree than p justifies h. I contend that Gettier-type counterexamples to definitions of factual knowledge violate the following principle: if one knows that h on the basis of p, then all the conclusions intermediate between p and h are true. This principle does not refer to anyone's beliefs that intermediate conclusions are true. I test my contention against several examples which have been discussed in the literature.
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DOI 10.1080/00048407512341071
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Feldman (1974). An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
Ernest Sosa (1974). How Do You Know? American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (2):113 - 122.

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